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Government community service contracts: 
Restraining abuse of power 
Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Amanda McBratney* 
The use of grant contracts to deliver community services is now a 
significant feature of all Australian government administrations. 
These contracts are the primary instrument governing the provision 
of such services to citizens and are largely outside the usual 
parliamentary review mechanisms and constraints. This article 
examines the extent of the erosion of fundamental constitutional 
principles facilitated by the use of private contracts, by applying the 
principles used in scrutiny of delegated legislation to standard form 
federal and State community service contracts. It reveals extensive 
executive power which, if the relationship were founded in legislative 
instruments rather than in private contract, would have to be justified 




































































































































































































































































































































































 Government community service contracts: Restraining abuse of power 
the bureaucracy. One example is The OQPC Notebook by the Office of Queensland 
Parliamentary Counsel (OQPC).43 





















 not only operate retrospectively, but  its proposer  (invariably the Government) might treat  it as  law 
before it is enacted …; 
 abrogate the common  law right people have to avoid  incriminating themselves and to remain silent 
when questioned about an offence in which they were allegedly involved; 
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 give authorities the power of search and seizure without requiring them to obtain a judicial warrant 
prior to exercising that power; 

















































































































































McGregor-Lowndes and McBratney 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































McGregor-Lowndes and McBratney 
coerce non‐profits to comply, given the cost of litigation and odium of public dispute in 
relation to attracting public donations and volunteers. 
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themselves and the community no good. The Productivity Commission Report108 has shown 
such behaviour hampers non‐profit organisations’ ability to engage appropriately in social 
innovation and deliver the best possible service, which ultimately affects the client of the 
service. For the government, it conflicts with the spirit of the compacts and renders its 
“partnership” rhetoric rather hollow. Trust is undermined and the relationship suffers.  
  Whether the contract embodies the relational tension or causes it, or both, clearly 
the issue requires resolution. This article has taken up the suggestion of Saunders and Yam 
for the executive and Parliament, through the legislative scrutiny process, to restrain 
departments from acting with almost unbridled contractual power. An analysis of two 
community service contract templates shows that governments seek to erode significant 
fundamental rights and impose obligations well beyond what could ever be diminished or 
imposed with legislation. The legislative scrutiny procedures could be adapted for the 
review, not of every individual contract, but of standard form contracts. The process would 
not direct changes, but place concerns about the contracts on the public record, and 
require the executive to give a meaningful explanation to Parliament in response to these 
concerns. The mere process of producing guidance documents, such as has been done for 
legislative scrutiny processes, may well alter departmental behaviour to a more balanced 
outcome. This could offer a light‐touch intervention which may be more advantageous 
than trying to alter the foundations of contract law or expand administrative law into the 
commercial realm. 
 
 
108 Productivity Commission, n 1. 
